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Abstract 
The main objective is the investigation of possibilities of elevating existing and old 
information system to comply with the current information security criteria. The elevation 
process of one system security is included, in which one system already in production will 
be made to fulfill the requirements of current national auditing criteria.  
The subject is topical in the field of cyber security, as according to the national criteria, 
problems in information security are to be noticed in the planning phase; however, this 
has proven to be impossible in practice. The current cyber threats and best practice 
models (VAHTI, ISO207001, KATAKRI, etc.) are used as the theoretical framework.   
The study was conducted as a qualitative case study divided into three cases. The aim was 
to find the threats, how to mitigate them and also find the differences between commonly 
presented practice models and auditing criteria when dealing with an existing and a new 
system. 
If the anti-malware software cannot be installed in the target environment, it is not 
possible to detect security issues taking place when imported data is extracted and used in 
the environment. If the system is not updateable, then the continuous development and 
OODA loop will also be easily broken. One broken part of the OODA loop affects the 
functioning of all other parts.   If the system is newly procured, it is easier to keep track of 
all publicly available information and make contracts limiting all the information usage and 
publication. 
In the light of this thesis, it seems to be impossible to measure how the system hardening was 
carried out if defensive and detection mechanisms are not tested and trained.  
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Tiivistelmä 
Opinnäytetyön päätavoite oli tutkia jo olemassa olevan ja vanhan tietojärjestelmän 
mahdollisuuksia vastata tämänhetkisiin tietoturvakriteereihin. Työn käytännön osuuden 
aikana tehtiin yhden järjestelmän turvallisuuden korottaminen, jossa jo tuotannossa 
olevaa järjestelmää muokattiin siten, että se vastaisi tämänhetkisen kansallisen 
auditointikriteetistön vaatimuksia.  
Aihe on ajankohtainen kyberturvallisuuden alalla, sillä kansallisen auditointikriteeristön 
mukaan tietoturvan ongelmat tulisi ottaa huomioon jo suunnitteluvaiheessa, mutta se on 
osoittautunut käytännössä mahdottomaksi. Teoreettisena viitekehyksenä on käytetty 
tämänhetkisiä kyber-uhkia ja parhaita toimintamalleja (VAHTI, ISO207001, KATAKRI, jne.). 
Tutkimus on toteutettu laadullisena tapaustutkimuksena ja jaettu kolmeen caseen. Tavoite 
oli löytää uhkia, kuinka rajoittaa niiden vaikutusten haitallisuutta, sekä löytää eroja 
yleisesti esitettyjen parhaiden toimintamallien ja auditointikriteerien välillä, kun käsitellään 
vanhaa ja uutta järjestelmää. 
Jos tietoturvaohjelmistoa ei voida asentaa kohdeympäristöön, ei tapahtuvia 
turvallisuusseikkoja voida havaita, kun ulkopuolelta tuotua dataa puretaan käyttöön 
ympäristössä. Jos järjestelmä ei ole päivittyvä, jatkuva kehitys häiriintyy ja OODA-silmukka 
rikkoutuu herkästi. Jos silmukan yksi osa rikkoutuu, se vaikuttaa myös kaikkien muiden 
osien toimintaan. Jos järjestelmä on uusi, on helpompi pysyä selvillä kaikesta julkisesti 
saatavilla olevasta tiedosta sekä tehdä sopimuksia, jotka rajoittavat tiedon käyttöä ja 
julkaisua. 
Tulosten valossa vaikuttaisi olevan mahdotonta mitata, miten järjestelmän koventaminen 
on tehty, jos tunnistus- ja torjuntamenetelmiä ei testata ja niiden käyttöä ei harjoitella.  
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1 Introduction 
The motivation behind this study the ongoing work with existing systems and the 
implementation of information security measures onto pre-existing systems. The 
commonly accepted preferable approach to system security is to implement security 
measures at the time of the procurement of the system as a whole.  This study 
concentrates on comparing the differences between the implementation processes 
and the auditing of implementation processes of security systems implemented on 
both existing and pre-existing systems.  
Cyber security and information security business are currently trending industries. 
The auditing and building of secure systems is a growing business in the context of 
contemporary information technology and business world. Current Finnish Law 
requires for public contracts to implement certain information security requirements 
to be set for any new systems procured or to be procured by public entities. This is 
dependent on the intended use of the system and the area of government operating 
the system. (A 1.7.2010/681) 
Many of the currently used systems have been implemented before the publication 
of the current auditing criteria, laws and guidelines. In addition, many of the systems 
currently in the implementation phase have been procured before the publication of 
the auditing criteria, laws and guidelines. These systems do, however and somehow, 
have to be implemented and made to comply with the current auditing criteria, laws 
and guidelines. Compromises are, however, required as all of the current standards 
cannot be met by many of these systems and forcing these systems to comply with 
all these standards can be counterproductive. 
2 Research goals  
The aim of the study was to explore the differences between the new system, where 
the security requirements are considered already in contract phase, and the 
hardening of the old system. 
The aim was to create a model that can be used to bring information security 
controls into the existing system, as qualitatively and precisely as possible. The main 
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focus is on differences between implementing the new system and hardening the 
existing or previously purchased system. The research of the topic is necessary in 
order to gain the knowledge, how to identify the balance between the threats, assets 
that need to be protected, and information security controls. 
It is neither possible nor appropriate to fulfill all current standards. The system itself 
may include properties that are against current information security requirements. In 
addition, the current requirement and legislation did not exist when the existing 
system was engineered. Therefore, it may not be necessary to fulfill all the current 
requirements.  
Information Society code 971/2014, Ohje tietoturvallisuuden arvitointilaitoksille 
210/2016 O and KATAKRI National Security Auditing Criteria 2015 have been updated 
all between 2014 and 2016. Therefore, their requirements were not involved in 
procurement of information security system. In military industry purchasing 
processes may last even up to ten years, and the life cycle of the systems may be 
measured in decades. Therefore, legislation, threats and technology develop much 
faster than the applications. (Tietoturvakaari, Information Society code 971/2014.) 
National security auditing criteria describe for example some requirements for 
contract with organization or company. The personnel of a company should have a 
certain required level of security awareness. During software development some 
security controls, like static code analysis, should be implemented in order to avoid 
unsafe functions in code etc. (KATAKRI 2015 I 13.) 
Security auditing of an existing system, that has been in use previously, is outside of 
the scope of this thesis. An existing system in this case means that system is installed 
securely on new hardware and the risks are minimized by that kind of counter 
measures. Security vulnerabilities of an old information system referred to in this 
thesis are risks that are caused by other means. Lack of system updates or publicly 
known vulnerabilities are for example huge known risks. This might be caused by fact 
that a software supplier does not accept some updates, or updates are not tested 
and approved by a supplier.  
Other risks of this kind are caused by the fact that software might also be in use by 
other users, and default passwords, configuration files, source code or user manuals 
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might be publicly available at the time. It is not necessarily written in to the original 
contract that supplier should not sell the same software and documentation for 
other users and countries. This might expose vulnerabilities for hostile actors. 
One goal in this study is to identify possible security issues that cannot be fixed 
neither by hardening nor adding additional security measures. Threats that are 
identified should also be taken under consideration. Risks should be mitigated as far 
as it is possible, however, even after that there still remain completely unknown 
vulnerabilities. Even though there will always remain that black swan and unknown 
risk, it should not be cause for an uncontrolled situation. This remaining unknown 
part is outside the scope of this work and is more a part of the continuity 
management process.  
 
3 Research method 
The method of the study is a case-study, focusing on auditing criteria and and 
fulfillment of minimum requirements.  One reference system hardening is carried out 
in reality. The process consists of implementing security measures and auditing, and 
it is repeated until the auditing criteria requirements are fulfilled to that extent as 
required.  
Auditing criteria are built to set up the minimum level for the requirements that are 
set by law, and its purpose is to audit that the requirements are met. In this study 
one investigates different quidelines and how they can be used to fulfill the 
requirements of auditing criteria, even if the security requirements were not defined 
in the procurement contract. This study focuses on evaluation of VAHTI-programme 
and auditing criteria (A681/2010; A210/2016). 
  
7 
 
 
 
4 Theory background 
The word “cyber” was first introduced in 1948 by Norbert Wiener in his book 
“Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine”.  
Wiener wrote about how machines could someday work without human influence 
and constant control. He also introduced the term cybernetics, however originally it 
was translated from ancient Greece, where the term “Kybernetes” was used to 
describe the control on humans (governor) (Merriam Webster Online dictionary 
Cybernetics).   
In 1982 William Gibson wrote epoch novel “Neuromancer” that really adopted the 
term “cyberpunk” for wider use (Jenkins, 1997). In the 1990s the term “cyber” was 
really popular and widely used for many purposes to describe anything from 
cyberspace to cybersex (Newitz, 2016).   
The term “cyber” is used to explain where things take place and happen. This means 
that cyber domain is used to describe that things do not take place in physical 
domain and so called real world. Comprehensive security takes into count both cyber 
and physical world security issues. For example, it is possible to cause distraction to 
physical world from cyber domain by shutting down heating. It is also possible to 
distract cyber domain from physical world/domain by closing down power supply 
from data center. Comprehensive security needs both domains to be taken care of. 
For a Finnish vocabulary on comprehensive security and explanations on certain 
words refer to Sanastokeskus (Sanastokeskus 2014:22). 
Risks in both domains can be predicted by some factors and it is possible to expand 
preparedness plans up to imaginary risks. In the scope of this thesis is, however, only 
about the technical aspect of national security audition criteria part. Risks are 
simulated by commonly known factors and models used behind best practice 
models.  Because of security classifications it is not possible to use threat models in 
this thesis.  
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Certain terminology is commonly used in the field of military information systems. In 
this study the term ”system” is used to describe the life cycle support models, 
computer hardware and software that are purchased as a part of certain 
procurement. Life cycle support models refer to help desk services, updates, 
upgrades etc. usually including the testing of COTS software updates with custom 
applications. The system includes life cycle support models that can be either 
internally produced or outsourced. Computer hardware can be custom designed for 
intended use or common off the shelf hardware. The software can also be either 
customized or it can consist of different kinds of CGM applications, where CGM 
refers to common government military of the shelf. 
4.1 Governmental and military business information systems security 
In the field of governmental and military business there are several constantly active 
threats and actors would benefit if security were to be compromised. These threats 
include e.g. governmental funded actors, military intelligence, activists and 
hacktivists, to mention a few. The industry tempts all kinds of actors both in peace 
and crisis.  
The military information systems are implemented as a part of a weapon system, a 
logistics system or another existing need. Military industry has been a pioneer when 
it comes to protected information. Many requirements, such as information back up, 
archiving and personnel security are already taken care of.  
In the military industry the protected information has different features than 
protected information, such as product design secret in commercial industry. The 
product design secret needs to be kept confidential throughout the product design 
cycle, where protected information confidentiality may expire after mission has been 
accomplished. On the other hand, the non-repudiation, integrity and availability of 
knowledge are valued more than in the commercial industry.  
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Figure 1. The Information Security triad (JohnManuel, 2009.) 
 
Availability, integrity and confidentiality are the three main parts of security, and 
balancing between them is the most important aspect of information security. 
Information Security Triad is the most commonly used model to describe this 
balancing. It is also used to help to identify the three main parts and to demonstrate 
how hardware, software and communications involve information security. 
Information Security Triad is the most commonly used model to describe balancing 
between Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. It is used to help to identify three 
main parts of the security and to demonstrate how hardware, software and 
communications involve information security. Balancing between availability, 
integrity and confidentiality is the most important aspect of the information security. 
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Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). Information Systems are 
composed in three main portions, hardware, software and communications 
with the purpose to help identify and apply information security industry 
standards, as mechanisms of protection and prevention, at three levels or 
layers: physical, personal and organizational. Essentially, procedures or policies 
are implemented to tell people (administrators, users and operators) how to 
use products to ensure information security within the organizations. 
 (Wikipedia, 2016.) 
4.2 Cyber security threats 
One of the most interesting publishing on cyber security field was RUAG´s espionage 
case. These kinds of cases are not usually published. RUAG´s case is a good example 
of two things. First, it demonstrates that it is impossible to build sure protection 
against governmental actor with unlimited resources. Secondly, it is a good example 
of how long time usage data logging and examination of the anomalies may reveal an 
APT actor. RUAG´s network was properly hardened against attackers, meaning that 
security measures were implemented and systems were updated properly.  
However, all implemented security perimeters were compromised and huge 
amounts of the data was successfully exfiltrated by an attacker.  
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Figure 2, timeline of RUAG case 
 
Timeline of the RUAG case is quite long, and as it can be seen, the malware has been 
present on the network for a while (MELANI:GovCERT, 2016). Costs of this kind of 
operation are extremely high. Malware used in APT attacks ate one time only 
useable and after detection it was almost worthless. Development of the malware 
itself have taken years. Development of this particular malware was based on Turla 
family of the malware that has been active since 2004 Over ten years of the active 
development means that costs for this kind of attacks are millions of euros. Also C&C 
channels, spreading of the malware and analysis of the exfiltrated data are 
expensive. Actors who have this kind of resources and who are able and willing to 
execute this kind of campaigns are active on this field of military information 
systems. (Symantec Security response, 2014.) 
4.3 Development of software suppliers  
The original procurement contract can have been made with a company that has 
evolved in many ways. The name, personnel and ownership of the company may 
have changed many times during a project. One example of this is Airbus Defence 
and Space. As the following chart describes, the company has evolved during the last 
ten years. In 2016 company was again at changing state and Defence and Space will 
be reorganized at first quarter of 2017 (Airbus DS Electronics and Border Security 
(EBS), 2016). 
12 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Airbus Defence and Space (Wikipedia, 2016.) 
 
An existing system may have been in operational or testing use already. The system 
may be already compromised. Vatanen (2015) wrote his thesis on Intrusion 
Detection During IT Security Audits. Usually, during the new system implementation, 
all hardware devices are new, as far sealed and secure as possible. There are also 
requirements that all devices and software should be delivered only by secure 
companies and personnel. When the security level of an old or existing system is 
elevated and system is prepared for auditing, it might be the easiest way to fulfill the 
requirements by discarding all existing hardware, and to install and build new clean 
instance of complete system.  
4.4 Changes in the threat environment 
There has been a radical change in the threat environment during the past ten years. 
Both comprehensive security and the actors causing threats have changed.  Hacking 
has become more professional. After Edward Snowden revealed large scale 
governmental information gathering, the awareness of activities of other intelligence 
agencies has raised. Western world intelligence agencies are more publicly known 
actors. This same kind of change has been going on also in the eastern world. 
Governmental agencies are recruiting more and more people, which can be seen as a 
threat as these actors have almost limitless resources of knowledge and money. 
China, for example has partly publicly admitted that they have a cyber intelligence 
project going on. (Greenwald, MacAskill and Potras 2013; Harris 2015; FireEye 2016.) 
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Protected assets are also developed, however, not so much as threats. Information 
that needs to be protected remains the same and the classification of restricted and 
secret information has not been updated during the last ten years. Physical security 
measures of information security assurance are almost the same as ten years ago.  
Sensitive information is still used as part of operation planning and it needs to be 
protected. What has changed, however, is the way this information is used. 
Information has to be accessible and authentic. As an example, airspace coordination 
order (ACO) needs to be distributed for many different systems and all those 
environments must get that information in order for the authenticity to be 
guaranteed.  US Airforce LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education 
defines information security perimeters for ACO´s as follows (US Airforce LeMay 
Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2014.): 
Effective airspace control means securing the systems enabling that 
control.  The systems comprising our airspace control system include, 
but are not limited to, sensors, communications, data processing, and 
common operating databases.  Information assurance programs such as 
communications security, physical security, emissions security, and 
network defense are methods to protect airspace control systems and 
information.  Due to the US military’s dependence on and the general 
vulnerability of electronic information and its supporting 
systems,information assurance is essential to airspace control.  
Additionally, when developing communication policies and procedures, 
it is imperative operations security (OPSEC) practicesare applied. 
 
5 Methods 
The study is a qualitative case study. The research question to be answered is how 
protecting an existing system, where security measures can no longer be built inside 
the system. differs from a new system, where security controls can be added directly 
into the system during development and implementation. A question to be answered 
is whether it is possible to pack the unprotected unsafe system with the help of other 
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security controls in a way that it creates a safe system? Also, if the system cannot be 
updated, what does it mean as far as the risks are concerned, especially if one has 
tried to protect the system by external means. 
5.1 Case 1, Is it possible to build protection rings and onion model 
security on an existing system 
National Security Auditing Criteria has one specific question regarding counter 
measures for malware defences. KATAKRI (2015: 47) describes how antimalware 
software can be left out if a scanning point is established and imported information is 
sanitized before it is transferred to the protected system(KATAKRI 2015, chapter I9, 
page 47): 
Torjuntaohjelmistot voidaan jättää asentamatta ympäristöissä, joihin 
haittaohjelmien pääsy on muuten estetty (esim. järjestelmät, joissa ei 
ole mitään tiedon tuonti-/vientiliittymiä, tai joissa tarkasti rajatuissa 
liittymissä toteutetaan siirrettävän tiedon luotettava 
validointi/sanitointi). 
Also a requirement of keeping a certain log of classified documents is included in the 
criteria. This logging requirement is only for classified information that is inserted 
into the system (KATAKRI 2015, chapter I 18 page 59). Requirements to keep 
classified data safe do not only mean that it should not leak out, but that it is also to 
be kept confident, integriable and available. 
Information flow from internet to secure environment may be implemented in 
following way: 
 
Figure 4. Information flow from unsecure sources to protected environment. 
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In this case it is assumed that data transfers are safe one way only, and they do not 
posses a risk of data leakage and loss of confidentiality. There still remains the risk of 
malware leaking from unsafe sources into the protected environment and causing 
the loss of data availability or integrity. In some cases, non-repudiation of classified 
data is an even more important asset to protect than the confidentiality or 
availability of the data in mission planning systems or similar uses, where 
information is used as a base for critical decision making. 
In this case it is assessed whether it is possible to fulfill requirements by simply 
creating a scanning point for inserted data, and how safe it is to scan imported data 
with a commonly used antimalware solution. There is a known risk that fingerprint or 
heuristics based analysis detects only previously known malware, and does not 
detect completely new samples or samples which are only used once. This risk is 
usually accepted, and therefore not taken into consideration during this case. 
Therefore, for example, sandboxing will not be implemented. 
  
5.2 Case 2, What kind of risks might be realized when system updates 
are not possible and system is not monitored 
The second case in this thesis concerns the updating of a system and the monitoring 
of system events. Information security is based on the OODA loop model where 
constanly updated threats and vulnerabilities are inspected and the system is 
constanly checked for marks of security incidents and the system administration 
reacts and implements counter measures against realized security events.  
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Figure 5. OODA-loop (Moran,P. 2008. John Boyd’s OODA loop) 
 
OODA loop refers to constant Observation Orientation, Decision making and Acting 
for external and internal security events (Moran, 2008). These events can be the 
released updates of the security patches from the software vendor, log entries 
showing a problem in the system or anything that can affect system security. 
The continuous improvement of the system includes constant checks of the system, 
clear implemented processes for checking available patches and updating the 
system. If one of these steps is missing it might break the OODA loop of the 
processes. This case aims to assess the effects on system security and the ideology of 
the continuous improvement of system security in a situation where the upating 
system is left out of the process. 
5.3 Case 3, If system has been implemented beforehand, what aspects 
of system security should be considered 
If the system has been implemented beforehand, there are several different vectors 
that should be taken into consideration. Firstly, if the system has been implemented 
and has been in use, there is the risk that the system has been comporomised before 
security measures were implemented. Secondly, there is also the risk that some 
active APT or malware already exists in the system that cannot be detected by simple 
scans. This is, however, left out of consideration in this thesis and this has been 
already investigated by Vatanen in his thesis (Vatanen 2014).  
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In this case it is investigated which risks remain, even if the system is installed into a 
completely new eviroment with sealed and secure hardware. If the system has 
previously been in use, and installation instructions for the system exist, the 
installation scripts and system have been used by several users over a long period of 
time leading to many differend kinds of security issues being realized. Complex 
systems are usually installed partly by automated scripts and partly manually. 
If installation scripts or installation instructions have been used for a long time, there 
may still remain the possibility of them having been leaked. Software providers 
usually want to sell their products to as many customers as possible, and with as 
minimal changes as possible. Software releases also include usually some kind of 
installation instructions and documentation. Documentation is also copied for other 
customers. Government funded projects also have some publicity requirements, 
requiring that some documents are publiced on purpose to wide audiences. Patents 
are also publicly available information and so on. These factors lead to a great deal of 
design information and instructional information possibly already being public. 
As an example, if the system has always been installed with some simple passwords 
and those passwords are commonly known due to them possibly remaining in the 
installation instructions or in scripts, a clear security issue is posed due to the 
insecurity of the passwords. Main question of this case is, what are the ways of 
regonizing and identifying these security risks posed by the information which 
remains available to outside entities and beyond the control of the entity responsible 
for the implementation of the system before the system is implemented in a clean 
new environment. 
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6 Research results 
6.1 Case 1, How additional protection rings and security check points 
performed  
Limiting access to the system can be seen as consisting of many layers. The physical 
layer controls are usually required from systems with higher security clearance. 
Systems with higher than national restricted security level are not permitted to have 
any connection to the public Internet and people with access to these systems 
should have security clearance. Some data must be updated from unsafe sources and 
it must be inserted into the system. For example, a weather forecast is published on 
the Internet and it is transferred after checking to the secure system. There also 
remains the risk of losing the physical control over a workstation or an entire system. 
In any case, there should be security measures in place to prevent catastrophic 
failures as these risks may realize.  
6.1.1 Limiting open interfaces to the workstation 
Limiting open interfaces to the workstation can be seen as a basis for hardening. One 
should have a minimum amount of external interfaces to workstations. The portable 
work stations, that may also be used in unprotected areas, have to be protected in a 
way that prevents any catastrophic failures from happening, even if they were to end 
up in wrong hands. Small, but important measures can be taken to protect the data 
in work stations. Firstly, the data should be kept minimal. Secondly, it should be 
made sure that opening the work stations without credentials takes enough time, so 
that the security of the operation is not compromised. Thirdly, opening the work 
station should be so demanding that other than operators funded by governmental 
entities cannot do it with their limited resources. Figure 6 illustrates open interfaces 
in server client environment. Every interface poses a risk. 
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Figure 6. Simplified model of external interfaces. 
 
External interfaces of the system can be illustrated in different ways.  Simplified air 
capped network model can be drawn as figure above shows. The server is shown 
only as a simplified model without external connections. This is because the server 
can be protected and isolated with virtualization solutions and by controlling physical 
access to the server.  
One interface of the server is taken under closer consideration. Power line 
communication links are not widely seen as external interfaces, even if they exist as a 
default in new server hardware. Power line communications can be seen as a breach 
of the protection layer based on physical isolation. Servers and network devices with 
different security classifications may be located nearby in racks. Uncontrolled 
communication channels between different security classification devices should not 
exist. 
For example, HP has PLC communication capable power supplies in their new line of 
the servers. These features have been on the market for the last 6 years, and there is 
a Platinum series of power supplies which are installed in many facilities. Some of 
these power supplies require special cables and do not use home PNA kind of power 
line modulated signals for data transfers. In the case of HP, these PLC communication 
devices use HP ILO (Integrated Lights Out) module of the server. An ILO module is a 
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separate integrated computer inside the server, which runs a protection ring below 
operating system. The ILO module can control the server power supply and read out 
various data from the operating system. ILO software is a tiny ARM based proprietary 
operating system that can be audited only as a black box. PLC communication is used 
between servers and infrastructure hardware like rack cabinets for server power 
distribution, cooling management and server identification.  
HP Common Slot Platinum and Platinum Plus Power Supplies include an 
embedded power line communication (PLC) feature that allows the 
power supply to communicate server data (such as server name, UUID, 
and IP address) to an HP Intelligent Power Distribution Unit (iPDU). This 
feature is supported on most HP ProLiant G6 and G7 servers that 
support HP Common Slot Platinum power supplies, as well as on new HP 
ProLiant Generation 8 servers supporting HP Common Slot Platinum 
Plus Power Supply options.  
(QuickSpecks Overview, HP Common Slop Power Supplies, 2015) 
Figure X illustrates interfaces grouped by possibilities for access limitations.  
 
 
Figure 7 Simplified model how only certain interfaces can be disabled. 
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The external connections of the work stations can be limited either by cutting them 
out totally or by restricting communications that run through the interface of the 
work stations. Usually it is possible to completely remove wireless interfaces from 
the system. This can be done by simply removing physical wireless communication 
devices.  Other interfaces are much harder to disable or remove completely. 
Interfaces are either needed or cannot be removed.  
Low risk local interfaces are needed for a user to be able to access resources on a 
computer. Multibay or an equivalent interface is usually a SATA interface for a hard 
disk, but it may contain an i2c bus intefrace or another interface for battery. Display 
port is a bidirectional interface, but there have not been publicly known working 
exploits for that. Optical drive HID devices and soundcards can be used to infect a 
system, but the risk remains low as long as user accounts are not compromised. 
High risk interfaces such as Firewire, USB, USB Ethernet etc. are known to be 
exploitable to bypass security measures. USB and Firewire interfaces can be used to 
read out memory from a running computer even if the computer is locked. Microsoft 
(Microsoft article ID 2516445, 2014) has released instructions for how to block one 
simple attack vector by adding a group policy that prevents the installation of the 
two devices used to exploit the DMA vulnerability.  
A BitLocker-protected computer may be vulnerable to Direct Memory 
Access (DMA) attacks when the computer is turned on or is in the 
Standby power state. This includes when the desktop is locked. 
BitLocker with TPM-only authentication lets a computer to enter the 
power-on state without any pre-boot authentication. Therefore, an 
attacker may be able to perform DMA attacks. 
In these configurations, an attacker may be able to search for BitLocker 
encryption keys in system memory by spoofing the SBP-2 hardware ID 
by using an attacking device that is plugged into a 1394 port. 
Alternatively, an active Thunderbolt port also provides access to system 
memory to perform an attack. 
(Microsoft article ID 2516445, 2014). 
22 
 
 
Microsoft (Microsoft article ID 2516445, 2014) recommended resolution for this is: 
Some configurations of BitLocker can reduce the risk of this kind of 
attack. The TPM+PIN, TPM+USB, and TPM+PIN+USB protectors reduce 
the effect of DMA attacks when computers do not use sleep mode 
(suspend to RAM). If your organization allows for TPM-only protectors 
or supports computers in sleep mode, we recommend that you block the 
Windows SBP-2 driver and all Thunderbolt controllers to reduce the risk 
of DMA attacks. 
 
6.1.2 Least privilege principle and hardening 
Least privilege is a basic method behind the ideology of the hardening in this case. 
Everything that is not necessary for completing the job should be blocked out and 
closed. As these military information systems for operational use are usually built for 
one reason and one use only, there are a lot of useless and harmful standard 
features that exist in CGM and COTS software and hardware. Computer hardware is 
built to be usable in as many ways as possible and there are open interfaces of all 
kinds. Most of the open interfaces are not needed and network protocols and 
bundled software may just create security concerns or harm to the system. 
“Least privilege is a foundation principle for information. It needs to be 
applied to all aspects of information security at your enterprise. Since 
proper application is so widespread and diverse, many different parts of 
the organization can make or break its application. The principle of least 
privilege has a direct dependence of other foundation principles, as well 
as, a dependence on well-accepted control processes. Proper application 
of the principle requires an initial investment and an ongoing discipline 
on the part of all management and staff at an organization. The 
examples of modern operating systems demonstrate that the 
responsibility even extends to vendors outside the organization. “ 
(SANS Institute, 2003, 17.) 
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In this case the threat is an imaginary situation where a workstation has been lost. A 
full set of the National Auditing Criteria is not met. As the basic threat in this case is a 
situation where a workstation, or more precisely a laptop, is lost and everything 
within it is now in the hands of a possible evil entity.  This study aims to show what 
counter measures should be in place for the minimum protection to be met.  
A list of a basic hardening set: 
 Full disk encryption 
 Disk locked with ATA lock or similar 
 Trusted Platform Module 
 Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) 
 Firewire and USB DMA protection 
 RDP and other remote usage protocols disabled 
 Local Firewall enabled 
 User Accounts with sufficient passwords and lockout policies 
 Bios Protected by a password 
 
Disk Encryption is the basis of all the other counter measures. A national list of 
accepted encryption devices and software is maintained by NCSA (Viestintävirasto 
238/651/2013/2016). Bitlocker is not on this list, and if Bitlocker is used, it should be 
taken into consideration that at least the older versions of Bitlocker were vulnerable.  
At this time there are open issues with Bitlocker, and if Bitlocker encryption is used, 
then systems should be updated regularly and it should not be trusted. Nabeel has 
introduced two new vulnerabilities in Bitlocker and only one is fixed at this time 
(Nabeel, 2016). 
Bitlocker uses a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip that is usually connected to the 
Intel Active Management Engine AMT. Even TPM and Management Engine are not 
strictly tied to each other, usually the chipset’s own TPM module is connected to the 
AMT. For example, Lenovo has integrated TPM and other TPM chip on the 
motherboard. This is mainly because of the different TPM versions, but it might be 
also built to bypass the possibility for backdoor access to the TPM. Intel is currently 
one of the two vendors for enterprise workstation chipsets on the market. There is 
AMT technology present in almost all of the usable laptops.  AMT technology runs 
inside the new Intel CPUs and it has its own real time operating system. AMT is 
another computer inside the computer as Integrated Lights Out modules are, but 
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AMT uses RING -3 level and it is able to bypass all the security controls of the 
operating system. AMT technology has its own access to the network connection 
that bypasses all the firewalls and operating system level settings.  Because of this 
and the security concerns present in the AMT itself there is a chance that every 
system including Intel chipset has a backdoor ready for use that can be used by 
governmental actors. Rutkowska (2015) has published a credible writing about TMP 
and AMT security issues.  
In this example USB connections are vital for the system itself and it is not possible to 
remove them completely, as described in chapter 6.1.1. USB poses also another kind 
of a risk, as there are other than basic USB device connection. Ethernet over USB is a 
device class that is not a regular USB device that needs drivers and installs into the 
Windows environment as a new USB device. Ethernet over USB devices are simple 
USB devices that use the electrical connectivity of the USB port and work like 
Ethernet adapters. This opens a new kind of an attack vector that was introduced in 
2016 under the name Poisontap Samy Kamkar (Kamkar, 2016).  An Ethernet over USB 
attack is dangerous because it opens a new network interface and broadens the 
surface for possible attack vectors (Wikipedia: Ethernet over USB, 2016).  
Remote access to the workstation should be limited to the minimum. It would be the 
best solution, if all the incoming network traffic were to be blocked by a firewall. A 
firewall is mandatory, not only for blocking remote attacks over the Internet, but also 
to block local exploits in case physical control to the device is lost. RDP, telnet, SSH 
and other remotely useable services provide ways to exploit workstation locally. 
Any open interface means that a local attacker may gain access to the system by 
exploiting its weaknessess. The are several ways to exploit the local interfaces. For 
example, one local attack against phones was based on a brute force key code attack. 
There was a reset button hardwired to the circuit board of the phone. This worked 
because the phones marked failed login attempts only after giving a message to the 
user. By doing this the attacker gained unlimited attempts to breach the key code 
and was able to unlock the devices. Another, a more sophisticated way, was to 
remove the flash chip from iPhone devices.  The local attacker made cloned, exact, 
copies of the chip. Failed key code attempts locked out the phones. The attacker 
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replaced the locked copies of the chips with fresh ones and repeated this as many 
times as it was necessary in order to unlock the phones. (Skorobogatov, 2016.)  
National security auditing criteria 2015 chapters I08 and I15 (KATAKRI 2015) describe 
that all wireless communication must be regarded as a public network. If the 
protected, isolated, information system does not meet the minimum requirements 
for communication encryption, firewalling and hardening, then the easiest way is to 
remove all wireless communications. Removal of the wireless communication 
hardware is the most secure way to mitigate the risk of the air capped network 
exposure to the public network. 
National security auditing criteria 2015 chapter I08(KATAKRI 2015) describes that 
infrastructure should have necessary limitations and access control. All network 
devices, processes and shared directories should have their access limitations set to 
the strictest settings possible. There is also one separately mentioned clause that 
autorun, autoplay and automatic startup of all possibly vulnerable software and 
documents should be prevented from external media. Automatic driver installation 
of external devices should also be prevented when the workstation is locked. Bios 
settings should have a password protection. All these counter measures are designed 
to minimize the open interfaces to locked workstations. 
In the national security auditing criteria 2015 chapter I08 (KATAKRI 2015), there is 
also a requirement to enable the operating system’s own security enhancements. 
Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randimization (ASLR), 
Applocker and SELINUX are mentioned separately. There are some limitations to the 
usage of these techniques. Software vendors may not permit the usage of these 
because systems themselves are not tested and approved in the environment where 
they exist. Military information systems may have decades long development periods 
and therefore there exist underlying software components that still use Windows XP 
era libraries.  
Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) is a useful software to simplify the 
turning on of different hardening options in a Microsoft Windows environment. With 
older systems, these hardening options usually cause multiple problems. Older 
systems may, for example, require write access rights to the program folder for 
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users, and this is prevented by default. Also, direct device access is not preferred 
anymore as it was with Windows XP and older systems.  
Code signing could be one solution in air capped environments. Another useful 
technology for hardening is to simply implement checksum calculations and the 
search for discrepancies during system operation. Distribution of certificates, the 
comparing of modified files, the search for harmful modifications and discrepancies 
among normal usage model based file modifications require a lot of work.  
6.1.3 Problems in this model 
If the system is completely isolated from external networks and all external 
interfaces are protected, there still remains the need to import external data from 
untrusted sources. External data can be imported to isolated environment using 
separate scanning point. One particular test was conducted during the thesis to 
demonstrate how vulnerable this model is and how easily this model is 
compromised.  
National audition criterion, chapter I9 (KATAKRI, 2015) describes that it is not 
necessary to install ”defensive software”, if all input data for system is already 
scanned. When a scanning point is set up and all data is scanned, the question 
remains, how can system administrators be certain that all the inserted data really is 
scanned, and how is it possible to get malicious software past that scanning. 
Virus detection systems can be divided to 6 different categories: 
 Signature detection 
 Emulator and Sandboxing 
 Heuristic detection 
 Behavioral detection  
 Proactive detection  
 Host intrusion prevention and detection systems (HIPS/HIDS) 
 
Signature detection systems are the oldest and most traditional systems. With 
Signature based systems there is always the particular challenge that someone must 
have already previously performed the detection and created a signature for the 
threat before it can be detected.  Signature based system have good detection ratio 
for known files. Advanced, one time only useable malware files cannot be detected 
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with this technology. Most gateways and static file scanners are based on this 
technology. Scanning may also include reputation scanning, which means that 
scanned files external sources are checked for popularity and other values in order to 
make a decision about the reliability of the file. 
Emulator and sandboxing technology is an advanced detection system that attempts 
to run suspected executable files in an isolated and protected environment. In that 
environment the file is executed and the acts carried out by the file are analyzed. If 
the file triggers some suspicious activity it causes an alarm. This technology is time 
consuming and detects only malicious files that can be run with selected 
environment specifications.  
Figure X illustrates detection capability and complexity in virus detection systems. 
Heuristic detection software uses complex algorithms to detect malicious software 
by detecting previously unknown pieces and traces of a suspicious code. Behavioral 
detection means that software and the environment itself is under constant 
monitoring. HIDS and HIPS systems usually collect traces of any changes made to the 
system, files, registry and file checksums etc. 
   
 
Figure 8. A Model for Assessing Methods of Detecting Malicious Code (Sevchenko, 
2008.) 
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Signature based detection and heuristic detection are the most widely used 
technologies in scanning workstations in isolated environments. All the scanner 
engines, however, need to get access to the files that need to be inspected. 
Encryption protocols like https must be decrypted in a gateway for successfully scan 
files that are transferred. All archived data should also be extracted for scanning.  
F-Secure is a Finnish cyber security company that provides products widely used by 
most Finnish companies and governmental entities. F-Secure uses their own scanning 
engines and scanning engines based on Microsoft technology. F-Secure’s signature 
based detection system seems to share some components with Microsoft’s 
technology and the Heuristic, so called DeepGuard technology, seems to be more 
their own development.  
This one particular test was set up with F-Secure and the test setup was built in order 
to meet the requirements set in National Security Auditing Criteria chapter I9 
(KATAKRI, 2015) for separate trusted scanning points for imported data. In this test 
there are input files containing known test files called EICAR that are built for 
antivirus software testing. EICAR files have signatures that should trigger a virus 
detection without any real threat to the system. All F-Secure antivirus products are 
able to detect these by default. 
 
 
Figure 9. Test procedure. 
One vulnerability was found during the testing phase. When files were scanned on 
the scanning workstation, file numbers did not match the amount there should have 
been.  The scanning engine was able to scan extracted files without problems, 
however, when files were archived using a 7zip LZMA algorithm F-Secure was unable 
to open the archives and scan the files. 
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Same files were archived in both 7zip and in zip archive.  
 
Figure 10. Archived files in 7z package. 
 
Figure 11. Archived files in zip package. 
Files used for the test were OpenVas NVT feed update files. Files that include EICAR 
test files are large enough to demonstrate this behavior in the F-Secure scanning 
engine. The same folder was archived into both 7zip and zip format in order to 
demonstrate the behavior of the scanner engine in this example.  
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Figure 12. Scanning result of the zip package. 
When an archive including files in zip format is scanned, the F-Secure finds the EICAR 
test files properly.  
 
Figure 13. Scaning results of 7zip package. 
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When the same files are scanned in 7zip archived package, F-Secure was unable to 
scan the archive, but reported that one file was clean. 
 
Figure 14. FSAV command line tool forced to scan inside 7zip package.  
When a 7zip archive was scanned with command line tool included with F-Secure, it 
reported that one file was scanned, no files were skipped and nothing suspicious was 
found. This short and simple test was a demonstration on how easy it is to bypass 
antimalware scanning software. Bypassing the F-Secure scan did not require any 
complicated encryption software. Full scan report of the 7zip scan is included in the 
Appendix 1. F-Secure scanning results for 7z file. 
The behavior was found in F-Secure earlier in 2016, and it was reported by F-Secure 
as fixed within a 6.6.2016 update. A fix for 7zip file scanning did not fix this behavior 
completely, since there still remains a lack of user response to how the scanning 
results should be handled. If the scanning of files takes place only at a scanning point 
and not in a protected environment, and there is no antimalware software installed, 
then these skipped files marked as clean are a threat. F-Secure describes that a 
filesystem scanning feature is divided into on demand scanning (ODS) and on access 
scanning (OAS) (F-Secure, 2016).  
F-Secure stated that on demand scanning is designed to skip some files based on file 
size and calculated scanning time to ensure scanning performance. On demand 
scanning started manually by a user or on schedule skips these files as it predicts the 
scanning time to be too long and for the scanning to slow the system down too 
much. On access scanning is designed to scan all files after extraction.  
National Cyber Security Centre Finland (NCSC-FI) was informed that F-Secure 
products give the user indication that scanned files are clean and instructions on how 
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to demonstrate this as were included in this case. NCSC-FI was able to reproduce this 
and they opened a ticket for this task. Hopefully there will be some clear indication 
for the user in future that all the files were not scanned. NCSC-FI also replied that 
authors behind KATAKRI will be informed.  
 
6.2 Case 2, System was not updated and constantly monitored, what 
risks the system was exposed to 
6.2.1 System updates cannot be installed 
Military information systems involving aviation use usually have multi step quality 
and flight worthiness acceptance tests. System acceptance tests have strictly defined 
limitations and the updating of the system without complete test sets is usually 
impossible. DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification) is a basic guideline and standard used for flight worthiness acceptance. 
If DO-178B/C is required for an information system and configuration management 
of the information system is based on a model derived from that standard it makes 
system update installations impossible outside of the verification model. 
6.2.2 Systems logs are not inspected properly 
One of the most important principles in information security assurance is the OODA 
loop. OODA loop means constant Observation Orientation, Decision making and 
Acting for external and internal security events. When one part of the loop is broken, 
the rest of the process is useless. If observation is missing, it is impossible to make 
any decision and react to any threats.  This is the reason why observation of system 
events and continuous checking of event logs of the system is so important. 
System monitoring is the key part of the finding anomalies. Anomalies may signify 
hardware problems, access log anomalies or anything regarding any part of the 
system. Almost all parts of the modern information system may be monitored. 
Monitoring in its simplest form means supervising if all hardware is still in good 
condition. It may refer to any activity from checking if the LED light is green or red, to 
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reading emails generated by an automatic system once a day and checking if the 
automatic monitoring system has sent some notification.  
The system event monitoring process can be partly automatic, but there still remains 
a need in some point of the system administration for someone to make decisions 
and react to alerts generated by automatic systems. There always remains a risk that 
the administrator works for an evil entity. After Edward Snowden revelations, there 
were publications about fully automatic information security systems, capable of 
decision making, being used to replace humans in decision making processes.  
Federation of American Scientists have released Department of Defense paper of 
Army Insider Threat Program and Business Insider has more dramatic article about 
this topic about cutting down human resources in system administration tasks 
(McHugh, 2013; Allen, 2013). 
6.3 Case 3, Previously implemented or procured system was 
implemented, what happened regarding system security 
National Security audition criteria 2015 I13 (KATAKRI 2015) determines that software 
vendors should implement secure coding principles and software development 
processes should include checks for vulnerabilities. This does not, however, describe 
how software development related documents and design information should be 
handled.   
National NH90 software projects can be searched by Google and there are two 
related software project theses available by Ylinen and Hartikainen, in which the 
author of this thesis is mentioned, and in which a lot of information about systems 
used in the NH90 can be extracted. Databus describtions, attached devices and 
communications between systems can be extracted from the documents and even 
some images have been removed for security reasons. (Ylinen, 2013;Hartikainen, 
2014.) 
Classified and secret national information system documentation can also be found 
from public internet. ILPUC2 and related information systems are usually kept as 
confidential as it is possible, but information about that system can also be extracted  
from the public sources. Pro Gradu by Pikkarainen is available at Doria. Pikkarainen 
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(2013) presents a short describtion of the military systems EVTJ, Iris, Core etc. 
Publicly available knowledge about networks and user groups may be valueable 
information for hostile entities. Usually all information about this topic is classied. 
(Pikkarainen, 2013.) 
Custom military software procurement contracts have some limitations and they 
cannot be sold freely by software vendors. Some software components and 
documentation are reused in other projects and also sold to other customers. After 
years have passed and originally classified components with classified 
documentation have been in use by many customers, some end user or a customer 
might publish some information that could expose the original concept and 
vulnerabilities of the system for public.  
If the system is not recently reinstalled completely, there is a great risk that old 
administration user accounts are still present. If there have been Administration 
accounts that have not been monitored and administration tasks have not been 
logged, then there is also the risk of all the logs of the system not being consistent. 
Administrators may have been able to clean out some old incidents and traces of the 
security events. As Vatanen (2015) writes in his thesis, the inspection of the system 
logs from previous usage is an important task when system security level is elevated. 
Advanced Persistent threats are custom malware software made just for one use or 
altered from some family of malware software in mean to remain undetected by 
anti-malware product. APT malware software is custom built software that is 
designed to bypass security measures of the certain environment. Leaked 
information of the system may be used by evil entity as design material for APT 
malware software.  
Risks to security in existing systems are not usually caused by malicious software. 
Misconfiguration of the system is maybe the greatest cause of security risks. Old user 
accounts that are still present in the system are also one of the greatest causes for 
security risks. Default Administrator and Guest account names are proposed to be 
changed in National Security Auditing Criteria 2015 chapter I08. Vatanen (2015: 88) 
writes about one example describing an old Active Directory domain trust still active 
in a system, even after that system was supposed to be separated from said domain.  
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Integrated Lights Out modules may be without configuration and they may have 
active network connections with a shared physical network port. Network devices 
like switches may have default passwords still in place. There may be completely 
unnecessary administrator accounts present in the system. Even the documentation 
of the system may be publicly available and there may even be default passwords in 
place. 
In a Microsoft Windows environment there is the chance that a software has a 
service account that has default non expiring passwords. These accounts may be 
created by a software vendor and automatically created during system installation. 
There is a principle that a system should be made unfamiliar and unknown also to 
the software vendor.  
National trusted software vendors might end up being sold to any actor in the 
market. For example Stonesoft was a previously extremely reliable partner for the 
Finnish Defense Forces and for other companies working with information security. 
Stonesoft was known for their ability to investigate software vulnerabilities and that 
company took part in Finnish governmental workgroups for information security 
development strategy. Stonesoft was sold to Intel as a neutral information security 
actor and after that it was resold to Raytheon. (Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö, 2006; 
Darrow, 2015.) 
 
7 Conclusions 
The main research question was how protecting an existing system, where security 
measures cannot be built inside the system,  differs from a new system, where 
security controls can be incorporated into the system as default. As a result of the 
research a few greater issues were identified when security controls are 
implemented into the system afterwards.  
The first case involved adding additional security rings to protect the system. 
Additional security added afterwards may limit the access to the system, however, 
there always remains some open interfaces and ways to exploit the system. Both 
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new and previously implemented systems have the same kind of remaining risks 
after implementing the security measures. Open interfaces and losing the physical 
access of the device are risks with both new and previously implemented system. 
Security issues are raised if there is a limitation for anti-malware software installation 
to the target system. With a new system it is usually possible to implement anti-
malware software to the system itself, however, with previously implemented 
software it may be impossible because of the limitations from the software vendor. If 
the anti-malware software cannot be installed in the target environment, it is not 
possible to detect security issues taking place when imported data is extracted and 
used in the environment.  
The second case was about risks that may occur, if the system is not updated. With 
the new system it is usually possible to make a contract for continuous updates. If 
the system is not updateable, then the continuous development and OODA-loop will 
also be easily broken. If one part of the OODA-loop (Observation, Orientation, 
Decision making and Acting) is broken, it affects the functioning of all other parts.  
For example, if the system updates are not installed, there is no longer need for 
monitoring available updates and known, published, vulnerabilities. This causes 
serious damage to the comprehensive security of the system as there are limited 
ways to detect security incidents and then there are no ways to react if something 
happens. 
The third case concerned risks caused by a previously implemented system and 
leaked documentation. If the system is newly procured, it is easier to keep track of all 
publically available information and make contracts limiting all the information usage 
and publication. There were several documents publicly available on the Internet 
containing information about classified systems. By combining all the pieces together 
the hostile entity  may gain too much information. 
The most significant limitation for this thesis was the lack of knowledge about real 
threats. The information about threats is either highly classifies, it does not exist, or 
it is about known realized events. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of 
Excellence (Geersm 2011) has published a study how Sun Tzu´s Art of War still 
contains usable quotes in cyber warfare. 
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If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result 
of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every 
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the 
enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Geers, 2011.) 
 
The best known quote from Sun Tzu is introduced in this study and brought into the 
cyber domain. The same principle exists with threats. For example, it is easy to 
detect malicious software with the existing recognition patterns, where as previously 
unknown new threats are difficult to recognize. If one’s own information system 
environment is not familiar, it is almost impossible to defeat security threats. 
During the thesis the author realized that the topic of cyber security covers an 
enormous number of possible threats, and patterns for defending against them. 
Therefore, it is not possible to build a comprehensive security model that includes all 
of the possible counter measures. KATAKRI attempts to cover as many potential 
threats as possible, and it is a good guideline, if implemented completely and system 
auditing is done properly. Building up a completely auditable environment is usually 
too expensive and, consequently, only some chapters of KATAKRI are really 
implemented. For example, some parts may be left out since they are covered by 
physical access limitations.  
In the light of this thesis, it seems to be impossible to measure, how the system 
hardening has accomplished if no security incidents have been detected. The 
realization of real security threats is always an unwanted situation. Training for 
security incident detection is one important task, and it was realized during the work 
that it should be implemented in to the training and lifecycle support model. The 
documentation of the process of how potential security incidents are detected 
should be a part of the system administration manual.  The tasks to search for 
system events, access logs, anti-malware software logs and alerts should be 
implemented into the basic system administration task list.  
Simulated threats and how the system administration is trained to detect security 
events were also realized to be a part of the future development. This training can be 
carried out after the administrators of the system know both their own environment 
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and the security events they are expected to manage, cope with and resolve in the 
future. Training should incorporate threat models which are as realistic as possible. 
Using real threat models is, however, a challenging task, as they are kept secret and 
classified. The technical aspect of the threat is usually possible to be simulated in a 
training environment without exposing the classified parts of the real threat, such as 
potential attacker identity and possible advanced custom technologies. It is possible 
to simulate the similar kind of a detected event during the exercise. There are 
numerous software products in the market built up just for use in training. JAMK 
University of Applied Sciences has its own training environment to safely train 
working as the defending entity under attack using a simulated evil entity. These 
cyber security exercises should be one part of the secure usage model of a holistic 
system.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. F-secure scanning results for 7z file 
F-Secure Anti-Virus Command Line Scanner, versio 16.10.22.283 
Etsii haittaohjelmia tiedostoista ja järjestelmästä 
Copyright © 2001-2016 F-Secure Corporation 
 
7. joulukuuta 2016 20:52:24 
 
Komentorivi: d:\opinnäytetyö\paketti.7z /ARCHIVE /LIST 
/REPORT=D:\OPINNÄYTETYÖ\TESTIRAPORTTI7Z.TXT /ALL  
 
Työasema: kone 
 
Tarkistusasetukset: 
Kohde: d:\opinnäytetyö\paketti.7z  
Tarkista kaikki tiedostot 
Toiminto:  
 Virukset: Vain raportointi 
Tarkista pakatut tiedostot: käytössä 
 
Tarkistusohjelmat: 
F-Secure Aquarius: 11.00.01, 2016-12-07 
F-Secure Hydra: 5.15.154, 2016-12-07 
F-Secure Online: 16.15.23, 0-00-00 
 
Virustarkistuksen tulokset: 
D: 
MBR (0x80) 
MBR (0x81) 
MBR (0x82) 
MBR (0x83) 
MBR (0x84) 
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MBR (0x85) 
D:\OPINNÄYTETYÖ\PAKETTI.7Z 
 
Tarkistettu 
Tiedostot:                          1 
 
Tulos 
Virukset:                           0 
Vakoiluohjelmat:                    0 
Mahdollisesti tartunnan saanut:      0 
Riskiohjelma:                       0 
 
Toiminnot 
Puhdistettu:                        0 
Poistettu:                          0 
Nimetty uudelleen:                  0 
Asetettu karanteeniin:              0 
 
Käynnistyssektorit 
Tarkistettu:                        7 
Saanut tartunnan:                   0 
Mahdollisesti tartunnan saanut:      0 
Puhdistettu:                        0 
 
Aika: 00:00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
